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Mediatization of Conflict in the Social Media Era 
– A Case Study of Sino-Indian Border Crisis in 2017 
 
Abstract 
 
Inspired by the concepts of Arrested War and ANT (Actor-Network Theory), this study has 
traced and analyzed four main actors in the wars and conflicts in the social media age: social 
media platform, the mainstream news organizations, online users and social media content. 
These four human and non-human actors associate, interact and negotiate with each other in the 
social media network surrounding specific issues.  Based on the case study of Sino-Indian border 
crisis in 2017, the central argument is that social media is playing an enabling role in 
contemporary wars and conflicts. Both professional media outlets and web users employ the 
functionalities of social media platforms to set, counter-set or expand the public agenda.  Social 
media platform embodies a web of technological and human complexities with different actors, 
factors, interests, and relations. These actor-networks and the macro social-political context are 
influential in the mediatization of conflict in the social media era. 
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Today the media have become integral to the planning and conduct of war (Horten, 2011). 
Mediatization as a new and much-debated concept captures something of the more complex, 
active and performative ways that the media are involved in conflicts today (Cottle, 2006:9). 
Hoskins & O'Loughlin (2015) take ‘mediatization’ as the process by which warfare is 
increasingly embedded in and penetrated by media. It is a means of understanding shifting media 
power on and its use by a range of actors. They claim that the world is currently in the third 
phase of mediatization – Arrested War, meaning the professional media have arrested the social 
media dynamics and effectively harnessed them for their own ends (ibid).  
2 
 
However mediatized conflicts as a research field is still at an early stage, awaiting theoretical and 
conceptual development (Mortensen, Eskjaer, & Hjarvard, 2015).  More empirical studies are 
also needed to de-Westernize the current studies on media and conflict relations.  To fill in these 
research gaps, this study will use the recent Sino-India border crisis as a case to address 
mediatised conflict in the digital age from China’s perspective. This project will contribute to 
developing the concept of mediatization of conflict by integrating actor-network theory (ANT) 
with Arrested War and providing up-to-date empirical evidence through non-Western lens.   
This research will analyze the professional media’s news coverage and users’ comments on 
social media Weibo in China during the Sino-India border crisis in 2017.  It will discuss and 
demonstrate how the professional media and online users interact with each other and use social 
media platforms for their own ends.   
In this article, the concepts of mediatization of conflict will be explored, followed by research 
methods.  Then four main actors namely the non-human actors Weibo as platform and social 
media content in the form of Weibo posts and comments as well as the human actors Global 
Times representing professional news outlets and web users will be examined. Lastly discussion 
and conclusion will be given.  
Mediatization of conflict 
Mediatization is about changes. It studies the roles of contemporary media and denotes the 
process of societal transformations driven by communication technologies.  The concept of 
mediatization has been debated for long. Some scholars argue that mediatization describes a 
historical, ongoing and dynamic metaprocess, related to but distinct from globalization, that 
features the increased central role and influence of media in social life (e.g. Lundby, 2014; Hepp 
2009; Hjarvard 2013).  Others point out that the metaprocess view is so broad that the concept of 
mediatization ‘may not be suitable to contain the heterogeneity of the transformations in 
question’ (Couldry, 2008). ‘Mediatization is an awkward term, but one that has gained terrain in 
academic discourse’ (Lundby, 2014:3). To move forward the debate, Waisbord (2013) called 
scholars to go beyond the media dominance paradigm to assess drivers and consequences, to 
understand better the factors that bind, steer, and shape mediatization.    
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Though mediatizaiton is a vague and contested term, there have been growing researches that 
adopt the concept of mediatization of conflicts/wars in recent years. In his book Mediatized 
Conflict, Cottle (2006: 8-9) used the phrase ‘mediatized conflict’ to ‘emphasize the complex 
ways in which media are often implicated within conflicts while disseminating ideas and images 
about them’. He argues that the media-conflict relationship goes beyond the ‘reflection’ and 
‘representation’ but focuses on ‘media doing’ or ‘media performativity’. Morse (2017) argues 
that the study of mediatized war needs to extend beyond questions of control over information 
transmission and the military-media-audience power dynamics, and to include the moral and 
ethical responsibility to the suffering of distant others during wartime. 
 
Other scholars studied media and conflict relationship from different perspectives. Maltby (2012) 
examined British army’s media management strategies and argued that the military are 
increasingly ‘mediatized’ through integrating media in their operations and interacting with 
different actors based on the media logic. Horten (2011) argued that the mediatization of war has 
accelerated over the past fifty years and has established the media as the “fourth branch” of 
military operations beyond the army, air force, and navy. He emphasized the national 
particularities during the mediatization process including the cultural and historical 
circumstances.  Kaempf (2013) argued that the rise of new media technology has led to a 
heteropolar global media environment in which the media-war relationship has been altered. 
‘Digital new media has introduced a wide range of voices into the mediatisation of war’ (ibid).  
 
The most relevant work to this study is Hoskins & O'Loughlin (2015)’s ‘Arrested war: the third 
phase of mediatization’.  They argued that the process of mediatization is uneven as different 
actors employ different media for their own ends. They divide the process into three phases: 
Broadcast War, Diffused War and Arrested War. While the first phase features the stability and 
certainty with discrete and mono-directional media (the Big Media), the second phase refers to 
the Web 2.0 and new digital media ecology with connected, multi-directional media and chaotic 
dynamics.  In the third phase, Arrested War is ‘characterized by the appropriation and control of 
previously chaotic dynamics by mainstream media and, at a slower pace, government and 
military policy-makers’ (ibid). Siapera, Hunt & Lynn (2015) argued that diffused war does not 
necessarily lead to a collapse of communication hierarchies, but may create new or modify 
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existing ones. There are various actors on the media platform and the media platform itself is an 
actor.  
 
Previous researches have demonstrated the increasing and transforming role of digital media in 
contemporary wars and conflicts.  However mediatized conflicts as a research field requires 
theoretical and conceptual development (Mortensen, Eskjaer, & Hjarvard, 2015).  Hoskins & 
O'Loughlin (2015) also admit that the concepts and theory that are used to explain relations and 
interdependencies in the period of Arrested War remain uncertain. Hence, a conceptual and 
analytical model that delineate different actors (levels of analysis) as well as their relations is 
needed to unpack the complexities of mediatization of conflict. The model shall be feasible to be 
implemented and operationalized in the empirical research.  
 
Hence the author proposes the following model (Figure 1) to study the actions, reactions and 
interactions of four main actors in the news network in times of conflict and crisis – social media 
platform (non-human actant), the news organization (human actor) and the web users (human 
actor) via texts-based discourses (non-human actant).  This model integrates Arrested War phase 
of mediatization with the ANT. While Arrested War highlights professional media’s usage of 
social media, ANT is a pragmatic sociotechnical process in which actors seek to build and 
maintain networks (Law, 1999; Heeks & Stanforth, 2015). Journalism takes place in increasingly 
networked settings involving a wide range of actors and actants. Digital media do not just offer 
professionals a new voice but the ability to build new linkages of institutions, individuals and 
machines (Turner, 2005).  The significance of studying the four actors will be discussed below.  
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Figure 1: Integrating actor-network theory and the Arrested War phase to study the mediatized 
conflict in the social media era. 
 
First, the social media platform. In journalism, technological artifacts are traditionally not 
considered as an actor and they have been treated as intermediaries or carriers only. But looking 
through the lens of ANT, technology can act as actors and mediators, transforming the news 
process (Primo & Zago, 2015). Today the digital and social media platforms such as Facebook, 
Twitter and Weibo are everywhere. Digitalization is changing journalistic practices, cultures and 
institutions. The new ‘news ecosystem’, ‘ambient’ and ‘networked’ journalism have emerged 
because of practices predominantly related to social media (Steensen & Ahva, 2015).   
 
Second, the mainstream news organizations. In journalism, actors come in three flavors: sources, 
journalists and audience members. All are human and they are treated as analytically distinct 
(Turner, 2005). Through the ANT lens, news organizations and professional journalists need to 
act as hubs rather than destinations, engage in conversations and increase their reliability 
(Spyridou et al, 2013). As stated above, mainstream news organizations have appropriated social 
media and remediated social media content during the Arrested War phase.  
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Third, web users (the public).  In the news network, an important and diverse set of actants is the 
web users – ‘the people formerly known as the audience’ (Rosen 2006). Digital technology 
creates new public spheres where the audience can interact, intervene and participate. Audiences 
are empowered to impact on the editorial agenda through likes and shares (Morlandstø & 
Mathisen, 2017). As spatial metaphors such as networks, fields, or spheres indicate, the lines 
between professional and citizen, and between one organization and another have blurred (Reese, 
2016).  
 
Lastly, in the middle of the diagram are social media content including texts, videos, images, 
hyperlinks, and emoji.  The assemblage of these elements is a nonhuman actor in the network.  
As Law (1992) claims, agents, texts, devices, architectures are all generated in, form part of, and 
are essential to, the networks of the social. Using the network approach, analysis of the actors’ 
discourses will reveal the actions, interactions and relations among various actors.  
 
Since this study focuses on news network, Figure 1 only delineates four actors and their linkages. 
It is a simplified version of a complex web for analysis purposes. As a flexible and elastic model, 
other influential actors such as governments, militaries, business institutions, think tanks, 
computers, mobile phones as well as other intertwined networks can be added to this diagram.  
For instance, the social media platform itself can be a network involving social media company, 
software, hardware, programmers, engineers, etc.  The news organization is also a network that 
connects journalists, editors, managers, sources, audience, government, etc.  And web users form 
their own network. As Primo & Zago (2015) explained, ‘Each actant, human or non-human, is a 
network within other networks.’  
 
In addition, studies of mediatised conflict in the digital age shall be de-Westernized. McQuail 
(2006) claimed that ‘Western “communication science” does not offer any clear framework for 
collecting and interpreting observations and information about contemporary war situations’ and 
‘largely neglected were the colonial wars of post-Second World War and the many bitter 
conflicts that did not directly impinge on western interests or responsibilities’. His statement still 
stands today. The existing researches in media and conflict are mostly confined to the western 
democracies.  With the US’ global pre-eminence ebbing away, concerns have increasingly 
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centred on China’s ability to move from economic power to political leverage in global 
geopolitics (Brevini & Murdock, 2013). It is important to study mediatized conflict within the 
actor-networks in China. Three research questions are raised: 
RQ1. How do the mainstream media outlets cover the conflict/crisis on social media in China?  
RQ2. How do the web users respond to the professional media’s coverage on social media? 
RQ3: How do the actors in the news network interact with each other?   
Research methods 
This study adopts both quantitative and qualitative research approaches on the basis of case 
study, content analysis and textual analysis.  
The Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017 is selected for case study because on the one hand, it 
renders up-to-date empirical data about the crisis/conflict for social media analysis; and on the 
other hand, the short time period of this particular crisis makes the project manageable. It is a 
recent case appropriate to try out the newly proposed analytical model. This crisis refers to the 
Sino-Indian standoff in the Doklam region of the Himalayas where the borders of China, India 
and Bhutan converge. It started in mid-June when China attempted to build a road in an area it 
believed to be under its sovereign control, provoking Indian authorities to block the construction 
by crossing the Sino-Indian border with troops and bulldozers (Zhang, 2017). On 28 August, 
India withdrew all its personnel and equipment back to its side of the Sino-Indian border after a 
10-week intrusion into China’s Donglang area (China Daily, 29 August 2017). 
The target research subject is Global Times’ (GT) news posts and users’ comments on Weibo.  
GT, a commercialized nationalist tabloid affiliated to China’s flagship Party paper People’s 
Daily, was founded in 1993 with a circulation of 2.4 million copies. It specializes in international 
news coverage. By the time of writing, GT’s Weibo account has about 15 million followers. Due 
to its influence, GT’ Weibo account is an ideal venue to trace how a state-owned mainstream 
media outlet cover the conflict and interact with the web users in China. 
Quantitative content analysis and qualitative textual analysis are conducted to examine the 
patterns of GT postings and users’ comments on Weibo. The unit of analysis is each 
post/comment. The sampling time period was set for two months from 26 June to 28 August 
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2017.  Four undergraduate student interns formed two teams.  In each team, two students 
collected data for 15 days separately.  Guidelines were provided to all interns beforehand. They 
accessed Weibo and collected posts and users’ comments from GT’s Weibo account using the 
key words中印 (Sino-India). Students collected data and conducted preliminary coding based on 
the following categories: 
For posts: date/time, topic, content, news/views, news source, theme, format 
(texts/video/photo/hyperlink), number of forwards, number of comments, number of 
shares 
For comments: Date/time, post topic, users’ comments/replies, use of languages, use of 
emoji/emoticons 
As a result, a total of 71 GT posts and 1,409 users’ comments were collected. The trend/patterns 
of GT’s online news coverage and the users’ reactions will be presented and discussed later. 
Then five posts with the highest number of likes and shares as well as their corresponding users’ 
comments were selected for textual analysis with an aim of identifying key themes, frames, and 
use of languages/emojis. Frame analysis was conducted to identity frames using inductive 
approach.  Framing refers to the way news reports emphasize some aspects of an issue and make 
them salient to promote certain interpretations or public perceptions of events (Entman, 1993; 
2004).  As a dynamic process, framing involves frame-building and frame-setting (de Vreese, 
2005). Inductive approach means frames emerge from the material during the course of analysis 
without prior defined news frames in mind (ibid).  
Weibo: the platform 
Social media platforms have become a significant participant in China’s politics, culture and 
society.  As Rauchfleisch & Schäfer (2015) noted, China has established its own microcosm of 
social media.  Launched in 2009, Weibo (Sina Weibo) is a leading and largest microblogging site 
in China.  According to Weibo Financial Report (2018), Weibo’s MAUs (monthly active users) 
and DAUs (daily active users) reached 431 million and 190 million respectively in June 2018.  
About 93% of users accessed Weibo through mobile devices. Weibo’s transformation, technical 
features and usability, users culture, and self-censorship practices will be discussed next.  
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Weibo emerged in August 2009 as the microblogging service of Sina.com in the aftermath of the 
riots in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. At that time, Twitter was blocked and some domestic 
microblog services were also shuttered in China. Since then, Weibo has played an essential part 
in the public life of the Chinese people, reflecting China’s socio-political transition in the post-
Olympics decade (Guo & Jiang, 2015; Han, 2018). Han (2018) divides Weibo’s transformation 
into three stages: collective witness, ideological contention, and networks of expertise. They 
‘reflect a major transformation of social media and digital culture in China, from the civic-
minded public engagement and activism to the celebration of individual online fame and 
monetization of content creation’ (Han, 2018). On July 22, 2012, the official Weibo account of 
the People’s Daily (@renminribao) posted its first Weibo when a thunderstorm and flooding in 
Beijing killed 77 people. This event marked that official media stepping in the realm of social 
media. These official media not only incorporated Weibo in news production but took lead in 
public debate with their ideological stances. Since 2012, Weibo’s influence started to decline 
with the rise and competition of WeChat as well as the tightened state control in the digital 
media space.  In 2014, Weibo was listed at Nasdaq, marking its step into the global market 
(ibid).  
 
In terms of technical features and usability, Weibo, similar to Twitter, provides real-time 
information and it is characterized by three components: it enables users to post 140-character 
messages, address others with ‘@’ symbols, and use hashtags to topically mark Weibos, repost 
messages and answer them.  A distinct feature of Weibo is that users are allowed to include 
URLs in their messages and to attach images, music, and video files to their posts. Comments to 
a post are displayed right below the post itself (Poell, Kloet & Zeng, 2014).  In recent years, 
online content in video format becomes prevalent.  Weibo has developed new features such as 
short videos and interest-based information feeds (Weibo annual report, 2017). Meanwhile, 
Weibo faces copyright and technical issues (ibid). 
As for Weibo’s user and comment culture, ‘long weibo’, data monitoring and commenting 
practices as well as hyperlinks are special features.  A long weibo means the users attaching a 
picture/image that contain an article to their weibo to work around the limitation of 140 
characters (Poell, Kloet & Zeng, 2014). Weibo’s real-time character also allows its users to 
monitor countless data streams that run across multiple online platforms but converged on 
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Weibo.  Visual trickery, symbolic manipulation, parody, humor, and intense interaction have 
become key practices on Weibo.  Weibo’s comment culture increases ‘the sense of shared joy’ 
and ‘strengthens the articulation of an issue-specific public’ (ibid).  Hyperlinking refers to the 
practice of linking to an external website (Fu & Lee, 2016). Weibo users’ practice of 
hyperlinking has ‘extended the public and circulated content across the media landscape’ (Poell, 
Kloet & Zeng, 2014).  
 
Turning to Weibo’s censorship practices, the Internet companies in China are held responsible 
for the content and behavior of the users on their sites (Poell, Kloet & Zeng, 2014).  The Sina 
Corporation ‘must conform to the communications regulations set by the state, and the state 
constantly pressures Sina to ensure its censorship compliance’ (Guo & Jiang, 2015). Weibo 
employs about 1,000 full-time editors to monitor and censor users (Poell, Kloet & Zeng, 2014).  
Meanwhile Sina’s censorship is mitigated by the company’s commercial interests, and it 
therefore aims to remain as open as possible. Weibo content is neither entirely apolitical nor it is 
fully government-controlled or censored in all instances (Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015). Guo & 
Jiang (2015) also argued that both transparency and tight political control coexist on Weibo, 
which forms the paradox of Weibo.  Weibo is free, open and highly monitored. 
 
All these features of Weibo are essential in the way different actors mediate, interact, associate 
and negotiate with each other on the platform. As Poell, Kloet & Zeng (2014) argued, ‘Weibo is 
not one thing, but rather constitutes a techno-cultural assemblage which becomes entangled with 
a wide variety of other actors in the course of contentious episodes.’ 
 
Analysis of Global Times posts  
In this section, results from the content and textual analysis will be presented and discussed on 
the basis of GT’s posts on Weibo pertaining to the Sino-Indian border crisis.  
GT disseminated a total of 71 posts on its Weibo account @Huanqiushibao during the sampling 
time period, of which 53 are coded as news and 18 are views. It suggests that GT’s posts are 
dominantly news items rather than views on Weibo. As for the format of posts, the majority of 
posts contain texts, hyperlinks, photos, and/or videos. Three posts are texts only.  It reveals that 
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GT, as a newspaper-based media outlet, has fully employed Weibo’s multi-media technological 
features to disseminate news and views on the social media platform.  
 
In terms of news sources, more than half of the posts, 54% (38 out of 71), are taken from either 
GT’s print edition or GT’s website.  However, while examining the sources within the texts, only 
six news posts clearly show elements of in-house reporting. It reflects the common way of how 
Chinese newspapers do international news.  Editors usually start with selecting and taking 
information from external sources and then do follow-up interviews with Chinese experts and 
scholars to solicit their comments or views on the news events.  In other cases, journalists may 
make phone calls or go online to check and verify related information. One post dated on July 7 
was an exception.  It was titled ‘This is the corridor, which makes India live in the hypochondria 
that their throat is locked by China’.  It indicates ‘…staff correspondent(s) recently went to this 
area with strategic importance (Siliguri corridor) that bears the ‘geographical curse’, and made 
investigations…’.  This is the only investigative news report in which GT journalists conducted 
on-the-spot investigations on their own.  
 
Five main news sources were identified: 1) Chinese media such as People’s Daily, China Central 
Television Station, Xinhua net, Ministry of Defense website; 2) foreign and global media such as 
The Times of India, Indian Express, Dunya Pakistan online, Himshikhar Television of Nepal, 
The Australians, Reuters, CNN, and New York Times. 3) Chinese political elites such as 
spokespersons from Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military experts, research 
fellows, etc; 4) foreign political elites such as officials and diplomats from India, USA, Bhutan, 
Japan, Russia, etc.; and 5) Hu Xijin, the editor-in-chief of GT.  
 
Five main themes are generated from the GT posts. First, China condemned Indian troop’s illegal 
intrusion and demanded India to withdraw its troops. For instance, on 25 July, the post was titled 
‘Wang Yi (China’s Foreign Minister): Indian troops shall withdraw honestly’. Second, India’s 
changing attitude from confrontation to appeasement. For instance, the post dated on 6 July 
indicated, ‘India claims China’s road construction on the border posed severe security risks. 
China: what about India’s deployment of troops and building fortresses?’. About one month 
later, the 28 July post indicated, ‘Want to cool down the situation? Indian Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs reiterates “developing partnership” with China’.  Third, third party countries’ 
involvement and attitudes towards the dispute.  For instance, on 9 August, the post indicated, 
‘Slapped in the face! Bhutan claims Doklam is not their territory. Surprised why India entered 
China’s territory’. Fourth, military confrontation, military power, deployment and maneuver. For 
instance, on 11 August, the post was ‘Indian media: India gets upper hand than China in terms of 
air strikes.  (Chinese) experts: hitting airports is China’s strength’. Lastly, fake news and media 
hypes. For example, the 18 July post accused the Pakistan Dunya news network’s coverage of 
China’s rockets killing 158 Indian soldiers of fake news.  
 
Based on the themes, five main frames are identified: China’s foreign policy, India’s foreign 
policy, military confrontation, third party involvement, and fake news.  Some posts contain more 
than one frame, for instance, it may illustrate both India’s attitude/policy and China’s response 
and policy.  In these cases, both frames will be noted down. Table 1 below shows the spread of 
frames.  
 
Frames Number Percentage 
China’s foreign policy 27 38% 
India’s foreign policy 11 15% 
Third party countries’ 
involvement  
16 23% 
Military confrontation 15 21% 
‘Fake news’ 7 10% 
 
Table 1: Distribution of frames in GT posts on Weibo. (N=71) 
 
Table 1 reveals that China’s foreign policy is the most dominant frame (38%).  Third party 
involvement (23%) and military confrontation (21%) are strong frames.   
 
Turning to the popularity of GT’s posts, Figure 2 below shows the trend/pattern of forwards 
(shares), comments and likes.  The horizontal axis indicates the serial number of posts and the 
vertical axis indicates the number of shares/comments/likes on Weibo. The peak time occurred 
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on 4 and 5 August with posts No. 34 and No. 35 (See Table 2 for details), a few days after 
China’s military parade in Inner Mongolia on July 31, 2017. The parade was seen to ‘show off 
its might’ (Lockie, 2017) and ‘reaffirm the CPC’s absolute control over the army’ (Gao, 2017). 
In the aftermath of the parade, Chinese government reiterated its stance and kept demanding the 
Indian government to withdraw its troops. At other times, there are small rises and falls but the 
pattern is generally stable.   
 
 
Figure 2.  The trend of shares (forwards), comments and likes of GT’s Weibo posts 
 
Based on the level of popularity, five posts were then selected for further textual analysis (see 
Table 2 below). It can be seen that the top two posts, the editorial about Modi administration on 
4 August and the CNN video report on confrontation on 5 August, were the most popular posts 
that engaged deeply with the web users. Both have achieved the highest number of shares, 
comments and likes. The other three posts topped in either shares, or comments or likes 
respectively.  However, the degree of these three posts’ popularity or users’ engagement has 
dropped greatly in comparison to the top two posts.  
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34 4 Aug, 
15:44 
Editorial: Modi administration shall 
not be a sinner to start Sino-Indian 
war 
 
6281 20073 33084 
35 5 Aug, 
10:30 
CNN discloses confrontation videos 
on Sino-Indian border: Indian 
artillery-carriages run on roads of the 
front line  
 
5102 20834 23170 
57 19 Aug, 
20:30 
Suspected videos on Sino-Indian 
soldiers’ confrontation at Bangong 
Tso, throwing rocks at each other 
 
1033 2592 1434 
20 23 July, 
19:00 
Finally Indian authoritative expert 
speaks the truth: we are in the wrong, 
we have to withdraw troops! 
 
857 3381 5204 
41 9 Aug, 
16:50 
Two big institutions of Nepal strongly 
support China: ‘Doklam belongs to 
China. India shall withdraw troops 
unconditionally’ 
 
476 1892 7284 
 
Table 2: Five Global Times posts that have the largest number of shares, comments and likes.  
 
Furthermore, except for post 34 that is editorial (views), the other four posts are news pieces but 
they mostly sourced from CNN and Indian media outlets.  All the five posts used the multimedia 
format namely texts with hyperlinks, videos, and photos. They all used either frames of 
supporting China’s foreign policy (Post 34, 20 and 41) or military confrontational (conflict) 
frames (Post 35 and 57). 
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Put in nutshell, the traditional division of views/news as well as internal/external news sources 
do not matter much on the social media platform.  With the dividing line between views and 
news being blurred, both views and news items as well as in-house reporting and edited news 
reports can attract audience’s interests.  What really matters are the use of particular frames that 
are either supportive of China’s foreign policy or conflict frames, as well as the use of 
multimedia format, videos and photos in particular, at time of crisis.   
 
Analysis of web users’ comments and replies  
Corresponding to the above-mentioned five most popular posts of GT, a total of 42 pieces of 
comments and replies were selected for textual analysis. Themes, frames, peer-to-peer 
interactions, the use of languages and emoji/emoticons will be discussed below.  
Five main themes are generated from web users’ comments and replies. First, Web users criticize 
Chinese government as well as China’s domestic and foreign policies. Netizens often expand the 
discussions and relate the current Sino-Indian border crisis to other border disputes, history and 
domestic issues.  For instance,  one user commented: ‘Diaoyu island, Spratly island, Sino-India 
border  ok the only thing left is for Mongolia to take Inner Mongolia back…’. This quote 
suggested that Chinese government was weak and incompetent, getting itself into border disputes 
with almost all neighboring countries. Another user made more direct and harsh comments: 
‘…this country has no dignity or integrity…It’s totally no different from Qing dynasty, seeking 
peace with payment. Pity the 1.4 billion housing slaves who have to pay for mortgages, traffic 
fines, forced insurance, higher oil prices compared to overseas…’. These comments show the 
users’ discontents towards the government as well as its domestic and foreign policies.  
Second, pro- or anti-war debate. On the one hand, some web users claim that China shall fight 
against India.  For instance, they commented: ‘(We) shall use actions to tell India what to do, 
rather than having a spat fight!’; ‘Motherland needs a war to comfort the world’s unsettled 
heart’. On the other hand, some voiced their opinions against the war for different reasons: 
‘Hope it can be solved peacefully. Don’t want to fight a war. But if other countries come to 
invade us, we will show them a lesson!! China will win!’; ‘Give money if they want money. 
Give land if they want land. Or give them beauties. Don’t fire canons. The rich and the powerful 
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all went to USA! What can the poor do.’ These comments show that the heated debate is on 
among online users about fighting or not fighting a war with India. 
Third, provide suggestions on China’s strategies/tactics. For instance, one user commented: ‘(I) 
heard Doklam will become the firing range for China’s artillery and rocket army! But before the 
strike, (we) shall evaluate the reliability and precision of navigation function of Beidou 
(Northern Dipper) satellite system. In case of power-off or network breakdown, the commander 
shall have other means to continue with the fight.’   
Fourth, comment and evaluate India and other countries. Regarding India, comments include: 
‘India has the ambition to seek hegemony. It does not have the wisdom and capability to seek 
hegemony.  India thinks it can dominate the region because its population surpasses that of 
China’; ‘Play cheap in face of defeat. That’s certainly India’.  Regarding Nepal’s support of 
China, comments include: ‘Nepal used to be close to India when the Maoist party was in power. 
Later the Indian National Congress came to power…getting even closer to India’; and ‘Nepal’s 
economy, 70% 80% comes from Brother Three (India)’.  
Fifth, joke about and make fun of the news content. In response to the GT’s post about soldiers 
throwing rocks, web users joked: ‘(They) can have a snowball fight in two months’; ‘Who did 
the kick? Fantastic!’ 
Based on these themes, the following frames can be identified: comments on Chinese 
government, domestic and foreign policy; pro/anti-war debate; comments on India and third 
party countries; comments on China’s military strategies/tactics; and joke/humor. In comparison 
to the themes and frames of GT’s posts, despite some similarities and overlapping, web users’ 
comments have demonstrated much more diverse, different and critical voices. The scope of 
themes and frames are wider than that of the GT posts.  
 
Peer-to-peer dialogues/interactions dominate the commentary area on Weibo. Netizens either 
indicate agreement with certain comments, reinforce and expand the ideas, or they disagree with 
the comments, criticize and abuse the users. Two examples are given below. 
Example 1:  
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GT’s Post: Finally Indian authoritative expert speaks the truth: we are in the wrong, we have to 
withdraw troops! 
Users’ comment: Indian public intellectual  
User’s reply 1: Chinese public intellectuals must have had the climax  
User’s reply 2: You are slandering this Indian expert.  He is not public intellectual – what 
he said is true. He did not attack or smear his own country either. On the contrary, he is 
saving India.   
In this example, the peer-to-peer interactions showed different attitudes towards the Indian 
expert.  When one user called the Indian expert ‘Indian public intellectual’, one respondent used 
sexual language to allude it to Chinese public intellectuals.  The term ‘public intellectual’ in 
Chinese has negative connotations. It suggests that the well-educated Chinese who are active on 
the web and who enjoyed high social status slander and smear history. ‘They use some 
groundless historical facts as evidence and draw a conclusion: China will lose’ (JingshiVyan, 
2017). In view of this, another respondent disagreed with the labelling and defended the Indian 
expert.  
Example 2: 
GT’s Post: Suspected videos on Sino-Indian soldiers’ confrontation at Bangong Tso, throwing 
rocks at each other 
Users’ comment: I feel that India acts like a great power, though being elusive and speaking few 
words. It acts strong and does what it is supposed to do.  Looking back on China, it has been 
invaded by others for about two months. Chinese citizens either abused India or abused each 
other. Media made presumptions. Some departments gave warnings or they were busy looking 
through the historical documents and 1962.  It sucks! 
User’s reply 1: In the video, the way your father, the Indian soldier, rolled down the rocks 
was amusing! 
In this example, one web user praised India as a great power while criticizing China, Chinese 
government, Chinese netizens and Chinese media.  The respondent who disagreed with him 
humiliated and abused this user referring to footages in the post.  
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In sum, textual analysis reveal that GT’s posts have set the users’ agenda with its ideological 
stance and caused heated debate among web users on Weibo.  GT does not moderate or directly 
involves in the debate.  The online debates including comments and replies are a hybrid of 
information/opinion, rational/irrational, abusing/amusing, agreement/disagreement voices. While 
the online users’ comments are somewhat in alignment with the general themes and frames of 
GT posts such as China and India’s policy, third party involvement and military confrontation, 
online users generated new themes and frames such as criticizing China’s domestic policy, 
foreign policy and societal issues, abusing, joking and making fun of India and other countries, 
making fun of the video footages in the news, peer-to-peer interactions, and so on.  The themes 
and scope of the peer-to-peer dialogues are much wider, personalized, opinionated and 
diversified than that of the mainstream media. The mainstream media such as GT mainly plays 
the role of initiating, informing, enforcing and reviving the online debate. Online users share 
their opinions, emotions and participate in the debate, rationally or irrationally. 
Regarding the usage of languages and emoji/emoticons, in comparison to the official and formal 
use of languages by GT, web users have employed the functionalities of Weibo such as 
anonymity and emoji/emoticons to express themselves, make comments, and/or have a spat fight 
with other users. Table 3 below shows categories of some languages and emoji/emoticons used 
by Chinese netizens. 
Use of languages Examples 
Affirmative Unconditionally support our motherland, Chinese 
Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army of China 
Racist Can’t you just play with snakes, A San (India)?  
Sarcasm I think we can form a keyboard army. Let the keyboard 
heroes who commented on the national issues go to the 
frontline…  
Metaphor Actually it is only the urban management officers (UMOs) 
who can and dare to fight the war in China.  Americans are 
even afraid of China’s UMOs.  UMOs are China’s most 
elite troops who can fight a real fight.  
Parody Nepal: Big Brother, I’m running out of money  
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Humor What do you know, this is India’s tactic – making the 
Liberation Army laugh to death and then inherit our land  
Use of emoji/emoticons Examples 
Smile 
Which country in the world is not eyeing China with hostility?  
Laugh-Cry 
Nothing wrong.  You are not qualified to be the imaginary enemy 
of the USA.  
Spread out hands 
They are scared by road construction?!!!  Nobody else can do that  
Doge 
Seems the Indian experts have brains compared to Indian army  
Angry 
If we are not worried about the Belt & Road initiatives being 
screwed up, India would have already surrendered  
Table 3: Online users’ usage of languages and emoji/emoticons on Weibo  
 
Table 3 shows that the online users use a great variety of languages and emoji/emoticons to 
express their opinions, attitudes and emotions towards the border crisis and beyond. Since GT is 
a nationalist tabloid, it is not a surprise that many users use Weibo to stir up the nationalist 
sentiment, or to vent their anger using offensive languages, or to abuse others to achieve self-
satisfaction.  Some users make rational and insightful comments while others participate in the 
debate for fun or revealing certain sentiments.  
Discussion and conclusion 
This study has traced and analyzed four main actors in wars and conflicts in the social media 
age: social media platform, the mainstream news organizations, online users and social media 
content. These four actors associate, interact and negotiate with each other in the social media 
network surrounding specific issues.  Based on the content studies of Sino-Indian border crisis in 
2017, the central argument is that social media is playing an enabling role in contemporary wars 
and conflicts. Both professional media outlets and web users employed the functionalities of 
social media platforms to set, counter-set or expand the public agenda.  Social media platform 
20 
 
embodies a web of technological and human complexities with different actors, interests, and 
relations. Four conclusions can be drawn.  
First, the mainstream media have appropriated social media to cover the conflict/crisis, set the 
public agenda and influence public opinion.  News outlets such as GT have incorporated Weibo 
in its news production.  They post news updates and views regularly and lead public debate with 
their ideological stances. The content study reveals that the traditional division of news/views 
and in-house/external news sources are not so important on the social media platform.  The 
professional media’s use of foreign policy and conflict frames as well as the use of multimedia 
format are most important at time of crisis to attract the attention of and engage with the web 
users.    
Second, online users have created new frames, counter-set and expanded the public agenda.  
Professional media outlets initiate and set the tone of the debate.  Meanwhile, the web users use 
variety of languages and emoji/emoticons to freely express their views, opinions, attitudes and 
emotions.  In comparison to the mainstream media, the themes and scope of the peer-to-peer 
dialogues are much wider, personalized, opinionated and diversified. In the new social media-
enabled public sphere, the heterogeneous publics interact and participate in the debate. They also 
impact on the editorial agenda through likes and shares (Morlandstø & Mathisen, 2017).  
Third, contemporary wars and conflicts are mediated via social media platforms. Figure 3 
delineates the dynamics and interactions of four actors within the network.  
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Figure 3: Actor-network in mediatized conflict 
As Figure 3 indicates, social media platform and social media content are closely linked.  Social 
media content are part of Weibo’s comment culture. Weibo with its technical features, 
functionalities and user cultures have afforded news outlets and web users (individuals) an 
extraordinary networking power.  For news outlet, the platform has extended the news media’s 
reach and facilitated public participation in debate, thus ‘extended the public and circulated 
content’ (Poell, Kloet & Zeng, 2014). For web users, the platform’s comment culture 
‘strengthens the articulation of an issue-specific public’ (ibid).  In this case, the web users’ wide 
use of abusive, provocative, racist languages as well as criticisms about Chinese government and 
its policies suggest that Weibo presents an open and free platform when it comes to the border 
crisis.  
On the downside, the constraining force of the social media platform is embodied in the online 
echo-chamber effect and chilling effect.  Web users re-enforce their ideas and views about the 
on-going crisis by the means of sharing, commenting and interacting with other users, whereas 
those who make different voices encounter abuses and bullying, thus may be unwilling to 
participate in the debate any more.  
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In reversed direction, both news organizations and web users post news, views, comments and 
interact with each other, consequently add values to the platform and lead to network effect.  
Network effect refers to ‘the more users who can communicate with one another on a network, 
the more valuable the network is’ (Hayes, 2005).  The value of social networking sites greatly 
increase with the number of users. Law (1999) claims, ‘Yes, actors are network effects. They 
take the attributes of the entities which they include. They are, of course, precarious.’  
Fourth, the network approach shall integrate the social context and macro-structural factors into 
the analysis (Micó, Masip & Domingo, 2013). Nationalism is an important macro factor in 
studying contemporary wars, crisis and conflicts. As Montiel and colleagues (2014) argued, 
during international conflicts, domestic media can churn out news accounts that are not only 
morally ascendant but also entitle their homeland to clash with the other country. In China’s 
particular social and cultural context, nationalism is one of the key enduring driving forces which 
have shaped Chinese foreign policy as China increasingly integrates itself into the globalized and 
interdependent world, the so-called ‘positive nationalism’ (Chen, 2005). The Internet brings 
profound changes to the power relations between state and popular players. It creates a space for 
ordinary Chinese to take active roles in shaping Chinese nationalism by circulating their own 
nationalist narratives, interpretation and voices (Ma, 2018). This study has provided empirical 
evidence to demonstrate that both professional news media and the online publics in China 
produce, disseminate and mobilize popular nationalism via social media platforms.   
In sum, the network approach is useful in tracing different actors and revealing their interactions 
in the digital public sphere. This study has proved the synergies between mainstream media, 
social media platforms and user contents (Siapera, Hunt & Lynn, 2015). Social media platform 
has empowered the mainstream media and web users to communicate, interact and influence 
each other. In return, increasing number of media outlets and users add values to the social media 
platform, leading to network effect. This research has implications for the study of mediatization 
of conflict especially in non-democratic countries.  These actor-networks and the macro social-
political context are influential in the mediatization of conflict in the social media era. In the 
future, cross-cultural comparative analysis of media, conflicts and digital technologies can be 
conducted using semi-structured interviews and social media analysis.   
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